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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-1898 
__________ 
 
CYNTHIA YODER, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY MONTGOMERY COUNTY; MR. MICHEAL FALIN; MR. 
TODD N. BARNES; MONTGOMERY COUNTY ADULT PROBATION AND 
PAROLE; MS.  TERRY; MS. JEANINE WARTELL; CHESTER COUNTY 
PROBATION PAROLE & PRETRIAL SERVICES; MR. JOSEPH CARLINI; MR. 
WILLIAM MANN; MS. MAUREEN TRESTON; MS. DIANE CLEMENS; AMS LAW, 
P.C.; MS. ANITA SETH; MS. SHARON MEISLER; MR. BASIL BECK, Court 
Appointed Attorney 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-01274) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 1, 2019 
Before:  CHAGARES, BIBAS and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 4, 2019) 
__________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Cynthia Yoder, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing her complaint pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm.           
 On February 25, 2019, Yoder accompanied her son, Clifford Repotski, to the 
Montgomery County Adult Probation and Parole Department (the Probation 
Department), where he “reviewed his medications [and] signed papers without [Yoder’s] 
authorization.”1  Probation Department employees told Yoder that if she did not grant 
permission to search Repotski’s bedroom, which is located in her parents’ home, 
Repotski would “go back to jail.”  In her pro se complaint, Yoder alleged that these 
actions by Probation Department employees violated a power of attorney that she has for 
Repotski, and for her parents, the Strunks.  She complained that the “mental anguish of 
dealing with non-compliant, uneducated bullies of Montgomery County Probation 
Department gave [her] a headache, lack of energy, [and] stress ….”  As relief, Yoder 
asked that the District Court expunge Repotski’s criminal record, report the defendants 
for disciplinary action, and award her $40 million.   
                                              
1 Repotski was on probation from a conviction for possession of child pornography.  See 
Repotski v. AMS Law PC, 710 F. App’x 112, 113 (3d Cir. 2018).   
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The District Court granted Yoder’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, but 
dismissed her complaint with prejudice.  With respect to the claims that she sought to 
bring on behalf of Repotski, the District Court held that a pro se litigant may not 
represent a third party in federal court.  The District Court dismissed those claims as 
frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  The District Court also concluded that Yoder’s claim 
based on the Probation Department employees’ demand that she consent to a search of 
Repotski’s room failed to state a claim because she did not “allege that her own property 
or privacy interests were invaded in way” and because her allegation was not plausible 
given that Repotski had already granted authorization to search his home as a condition 
of his probation.  Therefore, the District Court dismissed that claim under 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  The District Court, moreover, concluded that any further attempts by 
Yoder to amend her pleading would be futile.  This appeal followed.2 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a sua sponte 
dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), like that of 
a dismissal on a party’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), is de 
novo.3  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  “To survive a motion 
                                              
2 To the extent that Yoder attempts in her appellate brief to raise new claims against the 
appellees, those claims are not properly before us.  See, e.g., In re Reliant Energy 
Channelview LP, 594 F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
3 We need not address the District Court’s determination that the claims Yoder sought to 
bring on behalf of Repotski were frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), as we conclude that 
those allegations failed to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  See Murray v. 
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to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  
Yoder brought several claims on behalf of Repotski.  In particular, she challenged 
Repotski’s conviction and sentence on the grounds that the investigators “were out of 
their jurisdiction,” that Repotski received ineffective assistance of counsel, that he should 
have been sentenced in “Mental Health Court,” and that he is entitled to an exemption 
from “Supervision Polygraph Testing.”  Yoder also vaguely claims that the law firm that 
previously represented Repotski was engaged in a “civil and criminal conspiracy.”  
Furthermore, she attempted to assert a claim on behalf of the Strunks, alleging that they 
“have been financially exploited” because they were not reimbursed, pursuant to the 2019 
IRS mileage allowance, for the cost of transporting Repotski to the Probation Office.  
But, as we have repeatedly explained to Yoder, an individual proceeding pro se may not 
represent third parties in federal court, and a power of attorney is insufficient by itself to 
allow a non-lawyer to litigate on behalf of another.  See, e.g., Yoder v. Good Will Steam 
Fire Engine Co. No. 1, 740 F. App’x 27, 28 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 
591 F.3d 666, 672 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 
661, 664-65 (9th Cir. 2008)).  Because Yoder is barred from representing third parties in 
                                              
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted) (explaining that 
court of appeals “may affirm the District Court’s judgment on any basis supported by the 
record.”).   
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federal court, she failed to state a claim in her attempt to assert allegations on behalf of 
Repotski and the Strunks.    
The District Court also properly concluded that Yoder’s remaining allegations 
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Yoder asserted that Probation 
Department employees violated her power of attorney and “bull[ied]” her in to 
authorizing a search of Repotski’s bedroom.  Notably, however, Yoder cannot 
demonstrate that the employees’ actions infringed on her constitutional rights.  The 
Constitution guarantees no right to represent others, see Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 
411 n.3 (2d Cir. 1976), and our rule barring non-lawyers from representing third parties 
in federal court remains valid.  See Osei-Afriyie ex rel. Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 
937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991).  The Probation Department employees’ alleged 
threat to send Repotski back to jail does not state a constitutional violation cognizable 
under § 1983.  See McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that 
mere threats do not amount to constitutional violations).  Furthermore, to the extent that 
Yoder alleged that the Probation Department employees violated her Fourth Amendment 
rights, her claim is not ripe, as there has been no search of a place in which Yoder has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) 
(stating that a claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests on some contingent future 
event).  Yoder also seemingly complained about injuries caused by judgments entered 
against her in various state cases.  Such claims, however, are barred by the Rooker-
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Feldman doctrine.  See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 
159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives lower federal 
courts of jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments).  
Finally, we agree that any amendment of Yoder’s complaint would have been futile.  See 
Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 288, 292 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining 
that "amendment of the complaint is futile if the amendment will not cure the deficiency 
in the original complaint or if the amended complaint cannot withstand a renewed motion 
to dismiss").   
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.4 
                                              
4 Yoder’s motion for monetary relief and to order Repotski’s release from the 
Montgomery County Correctional Facility is denied. 
